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Critical management scholars have noted how contemporary management practices encourage 
and sometimes require workers to adopt multiple identities, and that cynicism, irony and 
resistance are often manifested in those identities. In this paper, we explore some attributes of 
modern selfhood that make these positions possible.  We concentrate on two related aspects: (1) 
the capacity of people to reflect on, and manipulate, the selves that they present to the world, 
and (2) different forms of agency that actors can effect.  We argue that closer attention to these 
attributes can sharpen our analyses of organisational control and its impacts on the self. 
  





According to many management theorists, attempts by organisations to elicit greater commitment 
from employees by re-engineering their work values and work-related emotions have deleterious 
effects on employees’ sense of self.  Earlier theorists in this critical vein depicted normative change 
programs as totalitarian and capable of brainwashing employees into a passive acceptance of 
organisational norms (Willmott 1993).  Later theorists painted a more complex picture.  Basing their 
analyses on the results of empirical research, theorists such as Catherine Casey (1995) and Gideon 
Kunda (1992) noted that while some employees did indeed uncritically accept new forms of emotional 
expression and self-management, others distanced themselves, adopting postures that were self-
consciously fake, ambivalent and ironic.  Although these latter employees were not presented as being 
passive dupes, the effects of culture change programs on them was also deleterious.  Caught up in the 
play-acting, they were unable to pursue their working lives in an authentic manner.  Those who 
resisted or attempted to distance themselves through cynicism and irony did not escape.  While 
creating the illusion that they were ‘free’ from control, they merely reproduced the power structures in 
which they were enmeshed (Ezzy 2001, Fleming & Spicer 2003).  
 
These critiques of normative change programs raise interesting questions about the nature of the 
organisational self and its relationships to organisational power.  In this paper, we aim to address some 
of these questions.  Rather than focussing on the nature of the power that impinges on employees’ 
sense of self,  we focus on the intra and interpersonal dynamics that make it possible for them to adopt 
multiple positions or identities within and against regimes of organisational control.  Given that 
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‘normal’ adults are expected to exhibit some flexibility of self-presentation across different social 
situations, when does it become morally reprehensible for organisations to incite or require employees 
to alter their beliefs and behaviours?  The paper takes the form of a literature review, drawing together 
ideas that we believe are useful for theorising links between regimes of control on one hand, and 
employee positions, whether they be superficial play-acting, compliance, resistance, or capitulation, on 
the other.  More specifically, we explore two realms of theorising about the self – the much-discussed 
multiplicity of identities that organisational actors deploy (or are forced to deploy), and the forms of 
agency that they can effect.  Our aim is to open up these phenomena for closer scrutiny, and to link 
them with regimes of organisational control in a way that facilitates more finely nuanced evaluations 
of their political and moral ramifications.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, with reference to a well established stream of theorising in social 
psychology, we consider the self-dynamics that are involved in the production and maintenance of 
multiple identities, and relate these dynamics to some different forms of multiplicity that can be found 
in the literature in management and other fields.  Next, we consider how agency can take different 
forms, and how a consideration of these forms can inform our understanding of the positions that 
organisational actors adopt. 
 
 
Multiple selves  
 
An image of organisational selves as multiple and fragmented often appears in the critical 
management literature (Kondo 1990, Knights & Willmott 1989, Collinson 2003).  Multiplicity is 
frequently depicted as arising out of, and contributing to, insecurities and anxieties that are by-
products of normative regimes of organisational control.  But what does it mean to have a multiple 
self?  Does it mean that employees present different ‘faces’ to different people as part of their daily 
work, or does it imply something more sinister and pathological, such as the complete loss of a 
coherent sense of self?  To explore these different possibilities, we turn to a long tradition of theorising 
in social psychology that has sought to grasp the nature of the intra and interpersonal processes 
through which selves are constructed and maintained. 
 
To posit the self as multiple and/or fragmented implies that the self is not a single, homogeneous entity 
but conceptually separable into components that can interact (or fail to interact) with each other.  The 
idea that selves are constituted out of interacting sub-entities has a long history in psychology.  In the 
late nineteenth century, William James made a distinction between the self as subject (or self-as-
knower) and the self as object (or self-as-known) (Leary & Tangney 2003, 7).  By turning the 
consciousness in on one’s self and treating it as an object, the self can reflect on its attributes and 
actions, and alter them in response to prevailing social norms.  Charles Cooley’s (1902) term ‘the 
looking-glass self’ encapsulated those aspects of self that are developed in response to perceptions of 
how we think others see us (Jenkins 2004, 39-40).   George Herbert Mead developed these ideas 
further with his concepts of the ‘I’, the ‘me’, and the ‘generalised other’. The ‘I’ is the self-as-knower, 
the site of a more-or-less on-going consciousness. The ‘me’ is the self as an object of consciousness.  
In Mead’s model, the I and the me are in frequent dialogue, as a person initiates planned actions, 
responds to situations, and adapts him/herself to them (Mead 1934, 200-222). Following on from 
Cooley, Mead also incorporated social norms into the reflexive processes through which people create 
and maintain a sense of self.  Norms enter and permeate the self through the concept of the 
‘generalised other’ – an internalised representation of other people’s attitudes that is used to monitor 
and censor the self’s thoughts, actions and speech (Burkitt 1991, 40-43; Mead 1934, 154-155).  
 
In complex societies, people typically belong to different work, family, leisure and friendship groups 
whose norms are not necessarily consistent.  Some multiplicity in self presentation is therefore 
considered normal, and even a sign of successful adaptation (Burkitt 1991, 53, Harter 1999).  In 
Mead’s view, ‘a multiple personality is in a certain sense normal’, as ‘we divide our selves up in all 
sorts of different selves with reference to our acquaintances’ (1934, 142).  Only people who are 
‘somewhat unstable nervously’ experience a fragmentation of self (143).  While Mead provides a 
Garrety & Down/Performing and Agential Selves  APROS 11 
 108 
useful starting point for a consideration of the dynamics through which multiple selves are produced, 
his emphasis on successful adaptation inhibits its use for understanding how power can distort those 
dynamics.  To create some space for the potentially troubling aspects of multiple identities, even 
among those who are supposedly ‘normal’, we need a more complex model.  
 
In his discursive psychology, Rom Harré extended the work of Mead and others in ways that are 
useful for exploring the dynamics through which employees produce multiple selves (Burkitt 1991, 
61-68, Harré 1998). Harré (1998) distinguished three interacting aspects of self, which he designated 
selves 1, 2 and 3. These are not separate entities as such, but linguistic devices through which humans 
create, alter and sustain the complex phenomena that can be grouped into the concept of ‘self’.  Self 1 
is similar to Mead’s ‘I’ (Harré 1998, 74-5). It is the standpoint from which we experience and act upon 
the world, the embodied ‘self’ that we carry through time and space.   Selves 2 and 3 are both objects 
of consciousness, reflecting different, but related, aspects of Mead’s ‘me’. Self 2 is a person’s own 
‘self-concept’, a ‘loose knit cluster’ (70) of beliefs about oneself, ‘expressed, however inaccurately, in 
the content of confessions, self-descriptions, autobiographies and other reflexive discourses’ (76).  
Harré’s third self is implicit in Mead, but more fully developed in the work of Erving Goffman (1959). 
This is the self as it is presented to the world. This self may be a direct and unmediated expression of 
self 2, or a consciously manipulated image, in which a person presents a self that is different to the self 
2 as it is privately known and selectively revealed.  Harré’s scheme thus opens up a more complex 
conceptual landscape in which to explore issues associated with the multiplicity of selves that 
organisational actors are capable of experiencing and producing.   
 
When discussing multiplicities of selves, clarifying which  selves are implicated helps to refine our 
critique of the conditions that produce them.   Multiplicity of self 1, as occurs in amnesia and multiple 
personality disorders,  is rare and pathological.  Discussions of these phenomena belong more properly 
in the disciplines of psychiatry and neuroscience, and will not concern us further here.  The aspects of 
self that are interesting for examining regimes of organisational and self-control are those found in 
selves 2 and 3, and in particular, in the relationship between them.  If multiplicity in self 1 is rare and 
pathological, multiplicity in self 3 is common, ‘normal’ and even expected.  People who fail to exhibit 
any adaptability in behaviour in response to different social situations risk being viewed as simple and 
naïve, or rigid and socially inept.  On the other hand,  individuals who exhibit too much multiplicity, 
who fail to demonstrate any continuity of self-presentation at all, also provoke disapproval, as do those 
who deliberately adopt ‘false’ personae in order to manipulate others (Harré 1998, 150).  
Psychologically healthy and morally responsible adults are expected to portray a certain consistency 
and genuineness in their self-presentations, and sufficient social skill to adapt their selves 3 to different 
situations and roles (Lewis 2003, Taylor 1989).  This involves maintenance of a relatively robust and 
coherent self 2 that can accommodate and weather the social and organisational pressures that incite 
the production of multiple selves 3, some of which do not sit comfortably with the dearly held private 
preferences and beliefs that reside within the ‘true’ self.   
 
When does the pressure to produce multiple selves become morally reprehensible?  Which selves are 
implicated?  Should we deplore regimes of organisational control that compel employees to display 
different, and sometimes contradictory selves 3?  Or does the moral reprehensibility lie elsewhere – in 
the invasion of self 2, or in the skewing of the relationship that people try to effect between their 
private and public personae?   
 
First of all, we should recognise that a certain amount of inauthenticity in the presentation of self 3 
helps to oil the wheels of social interaction.  In a paper examining how the ‘authentic’ and 
‘inauthentic’ rhetorical strategies of organisational actors are linked to different aspects of the self, 
Sillince et al. (2003, 7) suggest that ‘if human communication were completely “authentic”, social 
interaction would often be hugely awkward as the conflict between values would constantly come to 
the surface’.  On the other hand, ‘a society that consisted solely of social game playing would be a 
nightmarish scenario – like being condemned to live a continual episode of Sex in the City’.   In the 
pursuit of personal and organisational goals, and in the interests of avoiding conflict, actors switch 
between authentic and inauthentic rhetoric.  According to Sillince et al, authentic rhetoric emerges out 
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of a person’s ‘biographical identity’, a version of self that is akin to Harré ‘s self 2.  These are acts of 
communication in which a person transmits what s/he believes to be his/her ‘true’ beliefs, values and 
preferences, at least those that are ‘true enough’ at that particular point in time.  The biographical self, 
though shifting and multi-faceted, is an enduring one – an identity that is experienced and developed 
over a lifetime.  Strategically deployed inauthentic rhetoric is linked to a more situationally variable 
and transient ‘social self’  that is concerned with saving face, avoiding conflict and managing 
impressions.  This self is akin to Harré’s self 3.  Sillince et al. claim that the use of rhetorical strategies 
in this way enables organisational actors to flexibly enact multiple selves while maintaining a sense 
that somewhere behind the performances lies a relatively coherent and continuous self that endures 
through the transience.    
 
Inauthentic rhetoric can clearly play a benign and even beneficial role in social interaction.  It does not 
necessarily have a corrosive effect on an employee’s sense of self.  The social self that is tactful and 
playful is superficial, and does not penetrate far, if at all, into the biographical self that is the home of 
a person’s ‘true’ feelings, attitudes and beliefs.  In her classic study of emotional labor, Arlie 
Hochschild (1983) depicted a different sort of relationship between selves 2 and 3, one that is more 
costly to the employees that are required to enact it.  Hochschild focuses on jobs that require 
employees to ‘induce or suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the 
proper state of mind in others’ (1983, 7).  Although she does not use the same terms as Mead,  
Goffman and Harré, much of her discussion is compatible with the framework outlined above.  In 
Hochschild’s terminology, workers in service or other jobs that require frequent smiles and the 
performance of a pleasant demeanour may adopt a ‘surface act’, in which ‘the expression on my face 
or the posture of my body feels “put on”. It is not “part of me”’ (36).  In other words, the emotional 
display is confined to self 3 – the presented self.  Workers who do emotional labor may also engage in 
‘deep acting’, in which they consciously manipulate their feelings so that they can put on a more 
convincing display  This ‘sometimes draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and integral to 
our individuality’ (7) – a self that is akin to Harré’s self 2.   
 
We all engage in deep acting in the course of our daily lives. We try to get into a ‘party mood’ to 
please our hosts, we try to pull ourselves out of depression or transform our feelings for a lover who 
has left us.  However, Hochschild warns that constant manipulation of emotions in response to 
organisational demands can be harmful, especially for those who ‘identif[y] too wholeheartedly with 
the job’ (187).  This type of worker, who  ‘has little or no awareness of a “false self”’ is liable to 
become stressed and burnt out as s/he loses the capacity to differentiate between the real and 
performed self.   Hochschild advocates instead a ‘healthy estrangement, a clear separation of self from 
role’ (188). Workers who can achieve this differentiation ‘clearly define for themselves when they are 
acting and when they are not; they know when their deep or surface acting is “their own” and when it 
is part of the commercial show’ (188).  The search for authenticity, for the ‘unmanaged heart’ is a 
romantic quest,  writes Hochschild, and a naïve and self-defeating one in our complex society. 
 
In contrast to Sillince et al. and Hochschild,  many writers on the contemporary nature of 
organisational selfhood do not distinguish between the different aspects of self that are mobilised 
and/or affected by regimes of organisational control.  Indeed, attempts to pick apart and analyse these 
aspects of self are sometimes explicitly rejected as humanist and essentialist (Fleming & Spicer 2003, 
Knights 2000, Rose 1996). With the investigation of self-dynamics off-limits,  concentration within 
the critical perspective is often focussed on the disciplinary mechanisms of normative control from 
which there is no escape.  A good example of this type of analysis is found in Fleming and Spicer’s 
(2003) paper on worker cynicism.  Within this framework, claims that workers adopt cynical attitudes 
to defend themselves against power are questioned because they ‘rest upon an implicit humanism [in 
which] the identity being protected is treated almost as if it is outside of power’ (160).  Because selves 
in all their manifestations are products of power, it makes little sense to differentiate between those 
who adopt cynical stances and those who don’t.  What matters is the performance of the 
organisationally prescribed tasks.  Fleming and Spicer give an example of a McDonalds worker who 
wears a ‘McShit’ T-shirt under her uniform, and state that: 
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even though our cynical McDonalds employee has transgressive tastes in clothing that dis-
identify with her employer, she acts as if she believes in the prescribed values of the 
organisation and it is at this level that cultural power is operating in its most potent form 
(166).  
 
This focus on action rather than belief is valuable because it forces us to question our common sense 
assumptions about the self and its relationship to power.  However, by focussing on action, we can 
lose a sense of what work means to employees.   An employee who adopts a cynical posture 
experiences his/her job differently to an employee who whole-heartedly and emotionally identifies 
with the prescribed company norms.  The differences in experience may have consequences for the 
maintenance of a viable sense of self within the power structures of organisations. These are humanist 
notions to be sure, but notions which still have salience for many of us who work in organisations.   
 
Not all critical scholars consider worker interiority to be completely off-limits as a topic of analysis.  
Indeed,  Fleming and Spicer find it difficult to sustain their own sceptical position, noting that ‘we 
often do experience a sense of interiority, a phenomenological space that we feel to be our very own’ 
(169).   Nevertheless,  a reluctance to enter into and explore (rather than just assert) what Eliot (2001, 
147) has called ‘the internal instabilities and fissures of the self’ means that the question of when and 
how multiplicity stops being a fairly ‘normal’ and even advantageous aspect of social interaction in a 
complex society, and begins to be something harmful and pathological is not really addressed.  Thus, 
as well as the different positions adopted by Sillince et al, Hochschild and Fleming and Spicer, 
described above, we can find the following in discussions of ‘multiple identities’:  
 
a) Robertson and Swan (2003, 847) claim that highly educated workers in a knowledge intensive 
firm make creative use of multiple identities. They ‘rely upon switching between identities in 
order to reduce the dissonance generated by the ambiguous environment’. 
 
b) Thomas and Davies (2005) argue that employees in the UK public services use their capacity 
to construct multiple identities as a form of resistance. That is, they ‘draw on alternative 
subject positions in asserting their identities in the organization, motivated by the difference 
between the subject positions offered with New Public Management and individual interest’ 
(690). 
 
c)  Collinson (2003, 534) notes that many people experience ‘discomfort and awkwardness when 
previously discrete “life worlds” come together, say when friends meet parents, or when work 
meets home’. 
 
d) Casey (1995, 150) claims that regimes of normative control in organisations, that play on 
deep-seated desires for emotional connection, foster the development of a ‘fragile corporate 
self’ that is ‘acutely ambivalent and conflicted’.  
 
e) Psychologists West and Martin (1994, 2/14) claim that people who are subjected to intense 
stressors, such hostage situations, physical, emotional and/or sexual abuse, or who are enticed 
into cults, can develop ‘pseudo-identities’ in which they are ‘induced to express beliefs and 
exhibit behaviours far different from what their lives up to then would have logically or 
reasonably predicted’.  
 
f) Girodo (1985, 1991) has studied undercover police operators, whose work requires an intense 
and demanding form of ‘deep acting’, as they assume fake criminal identities.  He found that a 
large minority of those who do this type of work experience ‘personality disturbances’, ‘role 
confusion’ and ‘depersonalisation’, as they lose track of who they ‘really’ are.  
 
Clearly, these six examples give markedly different portrayals of the experience of multiplicity. In 
examples (a) and (b),  employees used the multiple identities available to them in a creative way.  
There is a sense of robustness in the accounts of identity from which these examples are drawn.  
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Robertson and Swan (2003, 853) noted, for example, that the subjects in their study ‘have rare 
expertise and skills that had developed over time such that their sense of self or model of self-
knowledge is firmly grounded in their scientific or technological expertise’.  This grounding enabled 
the creative deployment of surface performances that did not seriously erode the integrity of the ‘real’ 
self, as it was perceived.   
 
With example (c), we see discomfort entering the picture.  Collinson’s example is a familiar one, but 
the impact of friends meeting family or work meeting home on one’s sense of self, though sometimes 
embarrassing and unsettling,  is fairly benign and mundane compared to the situations depicted in 
examples (d) to (f).  Harré (1998, 152) castigates writers in the post-modern vein who depict these 
common multiplicities in roles (wife, mother, daughter, worker, friend) as somehow ‘unsatisfactory, as 
if relative to some unspecified level of the tidy life, the ordinary lives of women... and men … ought 
to be remedied’.   He sees no way of remedying the situation, as it is a necessary aspect of the complex 
but interesting lives many of us lead.  Like Hochschild, he views the hankering after perfectly unified 
identities as unrealistic and romantic.    
 
Examples (d) to (f) depict circumstances in which the integrity of the self is more seriously 
compromised.  We have included examples from outside the field of management to broaden the range 
of situations that call for, or impose, the enactment of multiple selves, and to provide maximum 
contrast between situations in which multiplicity may be seen to be beneficial, and those in which it is 
associated with psychological harm.   Multiplicity of identities is clearly not a homogeneous 
phenomenon, but one which can be enacted and experienced in diverse ways.  Rather than producing 
blanket condemnations or celebrations of the phenomenon, we argue that analysts should pay closer 
attention to nature of the multiplicity, and the degree to which it impinges on the integrity of self 2 – 
that part of the self that we construe as the home of our ‘real’ selves.  As Anthony Giddens noted, our 
ontological security, that is, our sense that we have a reliable grasp of the ‘reality’ of ourselves and 
others, is tightly coupled to our capacity to produce a more-or-less continuous narrative in which we 
tell ourselves who we ‘really’ are (Giddens 1991, 47 - 63).   
 
 
Forms of Agency  
 
By exploring self dynamics in terms of selves 1, 2 and 3, we can appreciate how identities are 
simultaneously produced, experienced and enacted.  So far, we have concentrated on how 
organisational power relations facilitate and require employees to adopt and enact multiple identities, 
sometimes in a surface manner and sometimes more deeply.  As was evident in the discussion above, 
however, identities are produced within organisational contexts.  The multiplicity, fragmentation, 
compliance, resistance, cynicism and irony that management scholars detect among their research 
subjects are not just properties of the self, but enactments within the complex social milieus of the 
organisations in which those subjects work.  To explore how these properties of organisational 
selfhood are linked to action, we need to examine the forms of agency that organisational subjects can 
effect.  That is, we need to investigate employees as producers of control and well as its targets  
(Gabriel 1999). 
 
Like ‘the self’, agency is a complex concept that has been the subject of much debate, especially in 
relation to its dualistic partner, structure (Dawe 1978, Sewell 1992).  As Alan Dawe (1978, 365) points 
out,  tensions between agency and structure are a part of our everyday experience:   
 
While we never cease to experience ourselves as acting, choosing, purposeful, aspiring human 
beings, we also never cease to be aware of the factory gates closing behind us, the office days 
that are not our own, the sense of oppression by organizations nobody runs, the ‘not-enough 
world’ we are forced to inhabit most of the time. 
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In other words, the agency that we experience and are capable of effecting is almost always 
constrained.  To imagine that it could be otherwise is to fall into another romantic trap, similar to that 
which entices those who hanker after a completely authentic self.   
 
Like the self, agency has multiple facets which can be analytically ‘disaggregated’ (Emirbayer & 
Mische 1998).  Just as disaggregating the self into selves 1,2 and 3 enabled us to explore some diverse 
meanings and implications of ‘multiple selves’, a consideration of different forms of agency can help 
us build a more complex picture of organisational action and how it can contribute to and produce 
multiplicity, fragmentation, compliance, resistance, cynicism and irony.   
 
Attempts to define different forms of agency date back at least to Max Weber, who identified four 
types – instrumentally rational, value-rational, affectual and traditional (quoted in Dawe 1978, 392).  
Although there is much less consensus regarding forms of agency among social theorists than there is 
among theorists exploring different aspects of self (see above), some common themes do emerge.   
Weber’s scheme focuses on individual actions, as does Emirbayer and Mische’s much more recent 
attempt to delineate different forms of agency.  The latter identifies three ‘elements’ of agency that can 
be differentiated along a temporal dimension: - (a) The iterational element, found in habits and 
routines.  This form of agency is informed by the past, and is similar to Weber’s traditional action. (b) 
The projective element, which is ‘the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories 
of action’ (971) and (c) the practical evaluative element, which is ‘the capacity of actors to make 
practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action in response to the 
emerging demands’ of the situation (971).  All the forms of agency identified by Weber, Emirbayer 
and Mische can be found in organisations, and provide strategies through which actors produce, 
reproduce, subvert and challenge mechanisms of control.  However, to get a more useful handle on 
how conflicting and cross-cutting forms of agency might variously produce compliance, resistance, 
ambivalence and so on, it helps to have a scheme that focuses more strongly on the interactive and 
projective dimensions of agency.    
 
If we accept the three-fold view of the self presented above, then we can locate an aspect of ourselves 
that we identify as the home of our personal and idiosyncratic abilities, preferences and beliefs. This 
aspect of self effects an agency in its immediate environment which seeks firstly to express this self, 
and secondly to shape the environment as far as possible to suit the self’s personal preferences.  A 
person’s capacity to do so is obviously influenced by his/her social location.  We can illustrate and 
expand on these points by returning to the example of the McShit T-shirt wearing employee. Donning 
the T-shirt can be viewed as a conscious act of defiance, an expression of ‘true’ beliefs.  It is, first and 
foremost, a form of agency effected within the realm of the close and personal.  Following the 
terminology of Laurent Thévenot (2001) who disaggregated agency along a dimension of micro to 
macro social engagement, we can call this personal realm a ‘regime of familiarity’. Within this regime, 
our actions are primarily oriented towards producing comfort and convenience among the objects and 
routines that are the closest to us in our home and work environments.   
 
Wearing a subversive T-shirt is not just a matter of personal expression and preference, however.  It is, 
potentially at least, a form of communication, and with this mode of agency we enter an interactive 
realm, which Thévenot identified as a ‘regime of regular planned action’. This is a zone of more or 
less mutually comprehensible and coordinated collective action and interaction.  As actors engage in 
this regime, they must choose how to present themselves.  Do they present a self 3 that is more-or-less 
a direct reflection of self 2 (that is, show the T-shirt) or do they present a ‘false’ self (hide the T-shirt) 
in order to avoid undesirable consequences or to pursue particular goals that are more obtainable with 
the presentation of a false self?  In this regime, the projective and practical evaluative elements of 
agency identified by Emirbayer and Mische come into play, as actors imagine and evaluate possible 
futures and shape their actions and reactions accordingly.  Unlike Emirbayer and Mische’s 
individualistic scheme, however, Thévenot’s regime of regular planned action acknowledges the 
presence of other actors, whose intentions and actions may support or thwart whatever purposes a 
single actor might work towards.  
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As well pursuing actions within the close and personal and the interactive realm of situated collective 
action, actors in organisations also frequently effect, and are affected by, a third form of agency that is 
geared towards the construction of social arrangements that transcend time and space. This is a ‘public 
regime of justification’ (Thévenot 2001) where broader organisational and community rights and 
responsibilities are negotiated.  Here we find policies, laws and regulations, and bodies of professional 
and lay knowledge that legislate what is normal, proper and good. These are the results of an 
increasingly prevalent form of agency, in which actors speak not for themselves, but on behalf of 
others and their perceptions of the ‘greater good’.  As Meyer & Jepperson (2001, 107) note: 
 
a striking feature of the modern system is the extreme readiness with which its actor 
participants can act as agents for other actors. They can do this, with rapidity and facility, as 
employees and consultants, as friends and advisors, as voters and citizens. [..]. And they do it 
much more often and more easily than do participants in less rationalised cultural systems. 
Ready opining, on the widest range of issues is a notable feature of modern individuals and is 
distinctive to them.  
 
This propensity and incitement to act on behalf of others is an outcome of the historical processes that 
have produced western liberal democracies.  Citizens today are held responsible for themselves and 
others.  In a way, moves within organisations to encourage greater commitment from workers are a 
manifestation of this same trend (Meyer & Jepperson 2000).  Responsibility for performance is 
devolved downwards from chief executives to all employees,  and service workers who interact with 
the public are expected to take upon themselves the task of presenting a favourable impression of the 
whole company.  
 
Organisational actors inhabit all three of Thévenot’s regimes simultaneously, and mobilise different 
aspects of self across them.  Compliance, resistance, ambivalence, cynicism and irony emerge where 
regimes interpenetrate.  Expressing one self in the regime of familiarity (‘I hate McDonalds’) while 
enacting another self in the regime of planned regular action (being a compliant employee) invokes an 
attribution of cynicism.  If our employee were to wear her T-shirt openly, we could call her resistant, 
and the regime of regular planned action would be disrupted.  Her boss may then draw on a regime of 
public justification, that is, trans-situational rules about ‘proper’ behaviour among McDonalds 
employees, to censure her, this censure again being carried out within the regime of regular planned 
action.  If the employee loses her job, her regime of familiarity may be disrupted, as the flow of money 
that she needs to maintain her home and bodily comforts is interrupted.  If she joins an anti-
globalisation movement that demonises McDonalds and all it stands for (www.mcspotlight.org), she 
herself engages in a regime of public justification, but in quite a different way to her boss, who used 
company policy to dismiss her. 
 
The story of the cynical but compliant McDonalds worker can be used to argue that cynicism 
functions as an ideology because the illusion of freedom that it provides allows the power structures of 
capitalism to continue unabated.  This is a convincing and valid argument, but it an analysts’ 
interpretation. It exists within an academic regime of public justification in which those of us who 
attend conferences and write for critical management journals debate the moral and political 
ramifications of organisational control.  As we engage in this activity, however, we can lose an 
appreciation of the lives that our research subjects lead.  The theoretical frameworks discussed in this 
paper provide tools for dissecting subjects’ experiences and modes of being, so that we can examine 
how different organisational contexts produce compliance, resistance, multiplicity and cynicism.  
These are not (just) aspects of ideology visible to analysts, but modes of being and acting that emerge 
somewhat inevitably out of the tensions produced by organisational actions that span regimes of 
pragmatic engagement – from the close and personal to the public and contested.  
 
 




In this paper, we have taken as our starting point the observation that employees respond to normative 
culture change in a variety of ways, many of which are claimed to be deleterious.  Rather than using 
these responses as a springboard to criticise the programs, we have focused our attention on two 
related aspects of employee selfhood that are mobilised and implicated in normative control – identity 
and agency.  We have disaggregated these concepts into component parts in order to delve more 
deeply into the variety of ways that organisational actors may experience and effect their identities and 
their agency within and against the power relations in which they are enmeshed.  With respect to 
identities, we have drawn on work in social psychology to present a framework for thinking about the 
variable effects and implications of the multiplicity of identities that many organisational actors adopt.  
Such a framework can be used to refine our critiques of situations that facilitate or require the 
development and display of multiple selves.   
 
Agency, like identity, is not a unitary phenomenon.  We draw on recent theorising about agency to 
show how a consideration of the different regimes within which actors attempt to effect agency can 
help account for multiplicity, ambivalence, cynicism, compliance, change and so on.  Mechanisms of 
organisational control do not exist in some abstract space from which they flow directly into 
employees’ psyches, producing the variable effects that critical management scholars have observed.  
Instead, employees, going about their daily business, produce these effects as they juggle identities 
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